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Over time, as demand fluctuates around an underlying trend of growth, it can be observed
that airlines adjust the size of the aircraft in their fleets and change the frequency of the
service that they offer. In addition, on some routes, the advent of competition in the form of
an additional carrier responding to demand opportunities can affect the aircraft size and the
frequency of the incumbent airlines. All the airlines will, after entry, continue to adjust size
and frequency.
 The objective of this paper is to empirically examine these phenomena for the long haul
sector. A simultaneous equations approach is needed as there is two way causation between
demand and frequency and aircraft size and any simple equation model that ignores this
will produce biased and inconsistent estimates.
Data is examined from 1990 for ten routes linking UK airports to airports in the USA.
Departures from London Heathrow (LHR), London Gatwick (LGW) and Manchester
(MAN) are covered. The airports served and the UK departure airport are respectively,
LGW to Atlanta, LGW to Boston, MAN to Chicago, LGW to Dallas, LHR to Los Angeles,
LGW to Miami, LGW and LHR to New York (JFK), LHR to San Francisco and LHR to
Washington. These routes were chosen to cover a variety of stage lengths and degrees ofcompetition.  It was felt that 1990 was an appropriate start date because this history
encompasses the dismantling of the London area distribution rules and the relaxation of
regional airport North Atlantic access, and also gives a sufficient time series.
 Conclusions are suggested on the basis of each route and on more robust estimates for the
larger pooled time series-cross section data. This represents a novel attempt to examine
changes and the impact of competition on routes at both the aggregate and the disaggregate
level.  Due credit is given for the effects of slot and route entry constraints, and also for the







This paper examines the way in which airlines on 10 specific routes have behaved in order
to throw more light on the frequency/aircraft size decision. These routes were chosen
because, despite the slot constraints, the traffic levels are high enough to allow competition
to develop. These routes are examined individually and as a pooled data set. This represents
a novel attempt to examine changes on and the impact of competition on routes at both the
aggregate and the disaggregate level.
The annual route flows are taken from the CAA’s Airport Statistics, which gives only totals
for all the carriers on each route.  The supply data are obtained from the Official Airline
Guide, using the available issues for each year between 1990 and 1997. Before 1990, the
statistics were only available on a city pair rather than an airport pair basis.  The total
scheduled departures per week were noted for each carrier, giving the frequency, together
with the type of aircraft used for each departure. There is also an indicator revealingwhether the service is part of a code-sharing agreement as under Bermuda 2, no more than
two US and two UK carriers are permitted at London Heathrow. The flight numbers can be
checked to see if they show a shared airline designator code and of course, apparent flight
timings are identical. The tie-up between Virgin Atlantic and Delta is reflected in these
indicators for the routes to New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles. The number of seats
in each aircraft are taken from the data in the Flight International annual surveys of
commercial aircraft supplemented where possible by the airlines’ in-house magazines and
timetables
i.
Figure 1: Traffic by Route, 1990-97
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Figure 2 : Frequency by Route, 1990-97Year























Figure 3: Frequency against Traffic: Pooled Data
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03. Model and Variable Specification
In addition, partly because of the uncertainty over the period of lag inherent in the
relationship, it seems clear that a problem of simultaneity exists here giving rise to biased
and inconsistent results if  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is used, as although it
is known that the direction of causation is that traffic gives frequency, with some lag, it can
be argued that frequency gives rise to traffic, also with some lag and indeed is used to
manage market share (Janic, 1997). This is a demand-led, supply-led dichotomy.
Statistically, therefore, rather than empirically, it is necessary to account for this bias by
invoking a two-stage procedure
ii.
iii
Another possible explanatory variable, the variation in aircraft size, is a response to the
volume of traffic and the frequency offering deemed desirable on the route. Consequently,
if the model is able to determine frequency, given traffic, then aircraft size is also known,
given desired load factors and it does not seem sensible to deal with this on the right-hand-
side (RHS) of the equation.So if we take F = frequency, T = traffic and C = competition dummy variable then on the
above basis our initial model specification using OLS regression is that






























4.1 10 routes 90-97
F T  C
This shows that only the traffic variable is significant. The t statistics are 28.624 and
1.094 respectively and overall F statistic is 556.823.
















                          
This shows that the HUB variable is not quite significant but that such a destination
could appear to expect 391 greater frequencies per annum than a non-hub
destination. In addition, the relative stability of the AC variable can be seen.
The standardised regression coefficients, ß , are 0.757, 0.260 and 0.057 respectively
showing the greater contribution to changes in frequency from traffic when the
coefficients are put on a common basis. Elasticity, ￿ , on average can be determined
for the range of the data as
￿i = b ˆ . ( X Y
So ￿(T
^
) = 0.86, ￿(AC) = 0.46 and ￿(HUB) = 0.04. This shows that the traffic
variable is inelastic with a 1% change resulting in a 0.86% change in frequency. The
other two variables are also inelastic.
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AC-  HUB4.2  Route by route results
4.2.1 London Gatwick – Atlanta
C
AC
4.2.2 London Gatwick – BostonAC
4.2.3 Manchester – Chicago
4.2.4 London Gatwick – Dallas4.2.5 London Heathrow – Los Angeles
AC
4.2.6 London Gatwick – New York (JFK)AC
4.2.7 London Gatwick – Miami
AC
4.2.8 London Heathrow – New York (JFK)C
AC
4.2.9 London Heathrow – San Francisco4.2.10 London Heathrow – Washington
ACTable 1: Route by Route  results: Competition Dummy Variable
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C Table 2: Route by Route  results: No. of Airlines Variable










































The regressions show the relation between frequency and traffic to be the dominant one,
and that frequency is relatively little influenced by other factors that change over time. At
first sight this is counter-intuitive, because it is expected that airlines will compete on
frequency, that competition has been encouraged, and that therefore there will have been
changes in the way that frequency varies with traffic.  These changes will have been driven
by competition between existing carriers and also by competition between them and new
entrants.
The analysis shows that these changes did not happen to the extent expected, at least in the
period 1990 to 1997 on the routes examined. There are, in fact, many reasons why this
might be so.  The most obvious is that incumbent airlines will not compete in ways that will
increase their costs or reduce their revenues per seat unless they are forced into it. The
shortage of runway slots at Heathrow definitely reduces this possibility.
It seems, from the greater evidence of competition in the pooled data, that the airlines were
making their aircraft size/frequency decisions more on a system basis than on a route-by-
route basis, although the route by route results are statistically less robust.  This will clearly
be so when an airline is strengthening its hub operation and bypassing the traditional
gateways. Most airlines are looking for economies from fleet commonality when they
purchase aircraft (such as in crew training and maintenance
As alliances develop, airlines will be able to control market share more easily without
increasing frequency. The experience on the Vancouver/California routes shows clearly
that, following a period of classic frequency-based competition when the US and Canadaadopted open skies, the markets consolidated with code sharing in 1998. The routes are
now dominated by only two alliances, often only one to a route (Aircraft Commerce, May-
June 1999, pp 27-33).
6. Conclusions
This paper has examined data on the routes from available UK departure points to a variety
of US destinations, some of which are major hubs, using a regression model with a
specification designed to avoid simultaneous equation bias. Analysis of individual routes
allowed alternative specifications of a dummy variable representing competition to
experimented with. This showed that the only sensible specification was related to the
number of carriers on the route and this was significant overall in the pooled data. There is
some influence on the frequency offered from the number of competing airlines and this
influence appears to be stronger than in the case of short haul routes in Europe.
Nevertheless, the major influence on frequency remains traffic; the other identified
influences are relatively minor.
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i This data was collected by a former Loughborough University student, Robin Kirk, to whom the authors are
grateful.
ii 
ii The direction of causation can be examined following Granger (1969).
iii With the exception of Manchester-Chicago where AA is the only operator.
iv It is well known that collinearity affects both the estimates of the parameters and the size of the standard
errors and that to deal with collinearity by the omission of collinear variables introduces specification bias
that also affects the parameter estimates.
v Specifying Miami as a hub for South America did not give such good results.